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means and purpose of destroying life,"3 (3) the harmless nature of
defendant's conduct which produced no physical impact," (4) whether
defendant's conduct was intended to harm, and (5) the presence of
expert testimony."
Whether the determination is made in terms of proximate cause or
foreseeable risk, and no matter which of the five factors above are considered by the courts, public policy and common sense would indicate
that each case should be decided only after a complete hearing of the
evidence. The Orcutt decision seems clearly in line with the trend of
the times in delaying policy considerations until after a jury has found

negligence.

HARTLEY PAUL

Tavemkeeper's Liability for Act of Guest. In Miller v. Staton,' the
members of the Washington Supreme Court disagree on how properly
to apply the general rule that a tavernkeeper "owes the duty to his
guests to exercise reasonable care to protect them from injury at the
2
hands of a fellow guest."
At about ten o'clock New Year's Eve, 1957, the plaintiff and her
husband went to the defendants' tavern in Omak, Washington. At
2:20 in the morning the plaintiff, while drinking beer at a table next to
the dance area, was knocked to the floor and injured during a fight
between two intoxicated patrons. Earlier in the evening two fights had
been prevented by the defendants' employees.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to
provide sufficient policing to prevent the fight, and was awarded a
$25,743.37 verdict by the jury. The cause was reversed and remanded
for prejudicial error in admitting testimony concerning policing practices of another establishment and certain irrelevant medical bills.'
However, a majority of the court held there was sufficient evidence in
support of the plaintiff's allegations to attach liability for negligence.
It is the latter point that results in a sharp disagreement between the
majority and dissent. That the tavernkeepers' liability is to be based
53

Brown, Long, Arsnow.
6, Stevens, Jones.
Cauverien, Tate.
Vc Orcut.
55

1158 Wash. Dec. 874, 365 P2d 333 (1961).

2
Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 54 P2d 675 (1936) ; Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal.
App2d 150, 311 P.2d 128 (1957) ; Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957);
106 A.L.R. 1003; RESTATESIENT, TORTS § 348 (1934).
3 Miller v. Staton, 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 879, 365 P2d 333, 336 (1961).
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on negligence was not disputed. The positions differed as to what
elements are necessary to support a finding of negligence.
In the majority opinion only one sentence is devoted to a statement
of the tavernkeeper's duty and the court concludes that the jury could
find the defendants negligent. A lengthy dissent states the duty of the
tavernkeeper and asserts that the defendants could not have been negligent unless shown to have had notice of the "specific impending peril"
at a time when there was an opportunity to prevent the injury.' The
circumstances under which tavernkeepers have been found negligent for
failing to protect their guests from harm at the hands of a fellow guest
have been dealt with in other jurisdictions with surprising uniformity in
view of the strong language of the dissent.
Liability has been imposed for negligence where (a) the defendant
has admitted to the premises, or harbored, guests of known violent or
vicious propensities; I or (b) the defendant failed to act reasonably to
protect the plaintiff when the specific peril actually occurred, although
the defendant had no actual or constructive knowledge of the impending
danger.6 An "opportunity to prevent the battery" is inherent in either
situation.7 Where notice of the danger exists only at a time when
there is no such opportunity the defendant has acted reasonably, for
there is nothing he reasonably could have done to prevent harm to his
guest.
In an Oregon case, Peck v. Gerber,' the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent in admitting to his establishment a person the
Id. at 879, 365 P.2d at 340.
McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 115, 46 N.E2d 573 (1943) ; Peck v.
Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 54 P.2d 675 (1936) ; Marstad v. Swedish Brethern, 83 Minn. 40,
85 N.W. 913 (1901) ; Curren v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N.W. 1124 (1903). But see
Peter Anderson & Co. v. Diaz, 77 Ark. 606, 92 S.W. 861 (1906), which on the same
facts as Curren v. Olsen supra, comes to the opposite result. In both cases the defendant
knowingly permitted a guest to pour alcohol on the foot of a sleeping patron and set
it afire. The Arkansas court in denying recovery stated: "[T]he saloon keeper does
not hold himself out to the public as the protector of those who may be patrons of his
saloon. His business rather advertises him the other way." This statement has not been
accepted by other courts.
6 Accord, Hughes v. Coniglio, 147 Neb. 811, 25 N.W. 2d 405 (1946). The defendant
was held to have acted reasonably when the plaintiff was injured in a knife fight between
two other patrons of the defendant's restaurant. The fight occurred without warning
and the defendant had no notice of the participants' violent propensities. See Kingen v.
Wegant,
148 Cal. App. 2d 656, 307 P.2d 369 (1957).
7
Thomas v. Bruza, 151 Cal. App. 2d 150, 311 P.2d 128 (1957). In Fisher v. Robbins,
78 Wyo. 50, 319 P2d 116 (1957), one patron struck another patron on the head with a
beer bottle and the plaintiff was injured by a piece of glass lodging in his eye. In
reversing a judgment for the plaintiff the court stated at 319 P.2d 118: "Proof of
defendant's actual or implied knowledge of impending danger to his invitees and that
he had reasonable opportunity to avert it was indispensible to entitle plaintiff to a
recovery." See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 348 (1934).
8 154 Ore. 126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936).
5
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defendant knew to be of violent and disorderly propensities. The
defendant stated to the plaintiff at the time of the injury that he was
not surprised that the one who committed the battery would do such
a thing. In rendering judgment for the plaintiff the court stressed that
actual or constructive notice of the actor's violent propensities must be
established. Where such notice does exist there is a clear opportunity
to prevent harm to the plaintiff by refusing to allow that person to
enjoy the premises with the other guests.9
In Gurren v. Casperon,0 the only analogous Washington case, a
hotel was held liable for its negligence in failing to protect a guest from
an assault after the guest had informed the defendant's employee of her
fear of an assault by one Saunders who earlier had been ejected from
her room. In the principal case both the majority and dissent assert
they are following the Peck and Gurren decisions in arriving at the
duty of the tavernkeeper. The dissent sets forth the proposition that
as Gurren involved express notice of the specific impending peril, in
Washington such notice is a condition precedent to a duty to protect
guests from harm.1 1 The majority apparently takes the view that
Gurren does not limit what may constitute negligence but only is one
example of conduct which constitutes negligence by an innkeeper
toward his guest. This interpretation of Gurren seems most closely to
follow the apparent conclusion of the earlier Washington court that
whether the duty owed a guest by the innkeeper is absolute or one of
ordinary care, on these facts the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 2
Admitting that actual notice of the specific impending peril is not
required, one may still find fault with the majority's summary handling
of the negligence question. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
were negligent in failing to provide sufficient policing to prevent the
fight when the defendants reasonably should have known that fights
would occur on the premises. 3 If such a risk was forseeable at some
time when the defendants could have provided sufficient policing, the
0 In McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 115, 46 N.E2d 573 (1943), the
plaintiff recovered for injuries inflicted by a fellow guest who attacked him suddenly and
without warning in the defendant hotel's bar. At least five "bouncers", hired to prevent
fights, were present when the incident occurred. The guest who inflicted injury on the
plaintiff was intoxicated and had been prevented by the "bouncer" from engaging in two
near fights that same evening. In affirming the verdict the court stated at 46 N.E.2d
575: "The jury might have concluded that, in the performance of the duty resting upon
the defendant, Cunningham should have been removed.., some time before the assault
was committed."
10 147 Wash. 257, 265 Pac. 472 (1928).
"158 Wash. Dec. 874, 885, 365 P.2d 333, 340 (1961).
12 Noted 3 WAsn. L. REv. 194 (1927-1928).
13 Brief of Respondent, p.4. 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 890, 365 P.2d 333, 342 (1961).
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defendants would be negligent if a failure to do so was unreasonable,
even though they had no notice of the violent propensities of any
specific guest.
Even if the defendants were negligent in failing to provide adequate
policing, liability would not necessarily attach. Negligence does not
give rise to liability unless the risk resulting in harm was that risk
which made the defendants' act or omission negligent."' Only when
those two risks are the same may it be said that the defendants'
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The risks
created by failure to have adequate policing would seem to be an
inability to prevent a fight when its occurrence is obviously impending,
or to stop a fight begun without warning within a reasonable time.
The facts of Miller v. Stanton" would fall into the latter category.
The plaintiff did not contend that the fight which resulted in harm
to her could have been anticipated, nor did she show notice by the
defendants' of the violent propensities of either participant. The
plaintiff did not deny the defendants' assertion that the fight was the
product of a "surge of jealousy"' 6 experienced by one intoxicated
patron at the sight of his wife dancing with another. Without prior
warning or threats that would call attention to his plan, the one
attacked the other. Was the occurrence of this fight within the risk
created by a failure to have adequate policing? A sudden affray
without prior warning would seem not to be within the risk that
reasonable policing would prevent, except that reasonable policing
might have stopped the fight once it occurred before injury to the
plaintiff resulted. Yet the majority states that "the jury was entitled to
conclude that ... the defendants knew or should have known a fight
was ensuing in time to have stopped the fight thereby avoiding the
resulting injuries sustained by the plaintiff."'" (Emphasis added.) On
closer analysis there seems no way the defendants, or hired guards,
could have known this fight was ensuing.
This same situation was presented in Weikert v. Piccione, s in which
the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a nonsuit. The plaintiff had
been injured in the defendant's establishment during a fracas between
14 If but for the defendants' negligence the damage suffered by the plaintiff would still
have occurred, then "legal causation" is not satisfied. Scobba v. Seattle, 31 Wn2d 685,
198 P.2d 805 (1948) ; Viking Sprinkler Co. v. Pac. Ind. Co., 19 Wn.2d 294, 142 P2d
394 (1943); Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631 (1932).
38 Am. Jur.iVegligence § 63 (1941).
15 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 365 P.2d 333 (1961).
16 Brief for Appellant py. 30, 46.
17 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 877, 365 P2d 333, 335 (1961).

-8273 Wis. 448, 78 N.W2d 757 (1956).
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two other guests, and alleged that his injuries were the result of failure
by the defendant to provide necessary protection from assault and
battery by other patrons. The Wisconsin court approved the statement of the lower court that failure to have provided "guards" or
"bouncers" in the establishment was not actionable for "it cannot be
assumed that they would have prevented the assault which occurred
initially and without warning."' 9
Thus, in the absence of notice of the violent propensities of he who
committed the assault, a sudden affray without prior warning would
not seem to be the risk that reasonable policing would alleviate. This
analysis is excluded by instruction No. 1520 given by the trial court
which reads: "[I]f you find from the evidence that defendants did
not have a reasonably sufficient number of persons employed on and
policing the premises you shall find them negligent and your verdict
must be for the plaintiffs." No timely objection was made in the trial
court and the supreme court ruled it could not be raised for the first
time on appeal.
Another theory of negligence might have been argued by the plaintiff,
even in absence of any showing of knowledge by the defendants of the
vicious propensities of any specific patron: to impose liability through
the device of a Washington statute making the furnishing of intoxicating liquor to one known to be intoxicated a misdemeanor." This
criminal statute has never been made a basis for civil liability of a
tavernkeeper in Washington for torts of an intoxicated patron. However in two jurisdictions it has been held that such a statute imposed
a duty, the breach of which was held to be imprudent conduct and was
the proximate cause of injury to a third party by the intoxicated
patron.2 2 Both cases involved the liability of a tavernkeeper for
injuries sustained in an automobile collision caused by the negligence
of the intoxicated patron. It is clear that for such a theory to operate
the statute must be construed to confer a private rather than merely a
public benefit22 and the act resulting in harm must have been a result of
intoxication.
"INote 18, supra, 78 N.W2d at 762.

20 Miller v. Staton, 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 879, 365 P.2d 333, 336 (1961).

21 RCW 66.44.230 applies to one that is an ".... owner or manager of, or an employee
in any drinking saloon, drinking celler or public dance hall or music hall where
intoxicating liquors are sold or kept for sale." RCW 66.44200 states: "No person
shall sell any liquor to any person apparently under the influence of liquor."
22 Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A2d 1 (1959) ; Waynick v. Chicago's Last
Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
23 Rappaport v. Nichols, supra note 22, 156 A.2d at 8; Waynick v. Chicago's Last
Dep't Store, supra note 22, at 325, where the court states that the Illinois criminal
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Thus, if the plaintiff could prove that the affray was caused by the
defendants' breach of statutory duty and the harm to the plaintiff was
within the forseeable risk created by the breach of that duty, recovery
might have been had on this theory. There is an historical hurdle that
must be overcome to fasten liability with such reasoning, in addition
to finding a private benefit conferred by the criminal statute. At
common law serving intoxicating liquor was not the proximate cause
of injury resulting from intoxication. 4 Rather the voluntary drinking
of the intoxicant was the legal cause of the risk resulting in eventual
injury.2" This common law immunity of the tavernkeeper has given
rise to various dram-shop acts, imposing liability the tavernkeeper
would otherwise escape. In the great majority of states today the
mere sale of intoxicating liquor gives rise to no cause of action, even
though the sale was in violation of some law other than an applicable
dram-shop act."
A further point to be considered is that if the circumstances were
such as to charge the defendants with knowledge that fights would
probably occur, such a risk may have been as well obvious to the
plaintiff in the conspicuous absence of police protection. In that case
the defendants' failure to provide reasonable police protection might
involve no breach of duty, and thus negate that possibility of negligence 7 It is commonly said the guest has a right to rely upon the
belief that the innkeeper or tavernkeeper will preserve order and
protect the guest from injury. When that reliance is no longer
statute "is for the protection of any members of the public who might be injured or
damaged as a result of the drunkenness to which the particular sale of alcoholic liquor
contributes."
24
E.g., Cherbonnier v. Rufalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950) ; Fleckner v.
Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 946, 210 P.2d 530 (1949) ; Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d
803, 143 P.2d 952 (1944).
25,Ibid.
2
6 Wash. Sess. Laws 1905, ch.62, § 1, imposing civil liability on Washington Tavernkeepers, was repealed in 1955 by RCW 424.100. It may be argued that this repeal of
the Washington "dram-shop" act is an expression of legislative intent to not confer
a private benefit from the duty imposed by RCW 66.44.200 and RCW 66.44.230. Yet, the
opposite conclusion was reached in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A2d 1
(1959), where the New Jersey "dram-shop" act had also been repealed. judge Rosellini,
concurring in the principal case, implies such a result might be reached in Washington.
In quoting from Conolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 259 Minn. 373, 382, 25 N.W.2d 657 at 665 he
states: "It is the policy of the law, both statutory and decisional to protect the public
from social consequences of intoxicating liquor. There is perhaps no field of business
activity more hedged about with state and municipal laws and regulations designed to
protect the public. When a person engaged in that business permits crowds to gather
upon his premises for profit, he must recognize the risks which flow from the nature of
the business." 158 Wash. Dec. 874, 883, 365 P.2d 333, 339 (1961).
27 ".. .If the plaintiff consents to the risk, there is no duty to him, and hence no
negligence." PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1958).
28 See instruction No. 11 given by the trial court and discussed by the majority
opinion at 878, 365 P.2d at 336. Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936).
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reasonable, and the guest has knowledge of the impending dangers,
then the guest may be said to have assumed that risk if he voluntarily
remains in proximity to the danger.29
In Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 10 the New Jersey court stated that where
the plaintiff witnessed the bantering and needling that preceded the
fight and did not choose to leave, the issue of assumption of risk was
for the jury. A few cases attempt to incorporate assumption of risk
if injury from the crowd is a normal incident to the service offered.3
This issue is not discussed in the court's opinion or the defendants'
brief. It seems plausible that one who goes to a tavern on New Year's
Eve and remains there for over four hours must appreciate and accept
those risks flowing from an uncontrolled intoxicated crowd.
In summary, the majority opinion asserts that reasonableness is the
measure of the tavernkeeper's duty; yet it is not precise enough in
defining and analysing the elements of that term in the opinion of the
dissent. Certainly notice of the risk, either actual or constructive, at
a time when that risk may still be reasonably dealt with, is inherent in
the concept of reasonable conduct and need not be a factor which
further qualifies that concept. It is the finding that negligence was the
legal cause in fact of the risk which resulted in harm to the plaintiff
that must further qualify unreasonable conduct before such conduct
may be the basis of liability.
29 PROSSER, TORTS
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§ 55 (2nd ed. 1958).

20 14 N.J. Super. 420, 82 A.2d 210, 212 (1951).
31 See Thurber v. Skouras Theatres Corp. 112 N.J.S. 385, 170 Atl. 836 (1934). The
plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries suffered when pushed down in a theatre aisle
between shows by other patrons. The court stated that: "Patrons of places of amusement. . . assume the risk of the dangers normally attendant thereon. These are accepted

as incident to the enjoyment of an acceptance of the service which they afford." But see
Thomas v. Studio Amusements, 50 Cal. App. 2d 538, 123 P2d 552 (1942).

